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Artificial intelligence has seen several breakthroughs in recent years, with
games often serving as milestones. A common feature of these games is that
players have perfect information. Poker is the quintessential game of imperfect
information, and a longstanding challenge problem in artificial intelligence.
We introduce DeepStack, an algorithm for imperfect information settings. It
combines recursive reasoning to handle information asymmetry, decomposi-
tion to focus computation on the relevant decision, and a form of intuition that
is automatically learned from self-play using deep learning. In a study involv-
ing 44,000 hands of poker, DeepStack defeated with statistical significance pro-
fessional poker players in heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em. The approach is
theoretically sound and is shown to produce more difficult to exploit strategies
than prior approaches. 1
Games have long served as benchmarks and marked milestones of progress in artificial
intelligence (AI). In the last two decades, computer programs have reached a performance that
1This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the AAAS for personal use, not for
redistribution. The definitive version was published in Science, (March 02, 2017), doi: 10.1126/science.aam6960.
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exceeds expert human players in many games, e.g., backgammon (1), checkers (2), chess (3),
Jeopardy! (4), Atari video games (5), and go (6). These successes all involve games with
information symmetry, where all players have identical information about the current state of
the game. This property of perfect information is also at the heart of the algorithms that enabled
these successes, e.g., local search during play (7, 8).
The founder of modern game theory and computing pioneer, von Neumann, envisioned
reasoning in games without perfect information. “Real life is not like that. Real life consists of
bluffing, of little tactics of deception, of asking yourself what is the other man going to think
I mean to do. And that is what games are about in my theory.” (9) One game that fascinated
von Neumann was poker, where players are dealt private cards and take turns making bets or
bluffing on holding the strongest hand, calling opponents’ bets, or folding and giving up on the
hand and the bets already added to the pot. Poker is a game of imperfect information, where
players’ private cards give them asymmetric information about the state of game.
Heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em (HUNL) is a two-player version of poker in which two
cards are initially dealt face-down to each player, and additional cards are dealt face-up in
three subsequent rounds. No limit is placed on the size of the bets although there is an overall
limit to the total amount wagered in each game (10). AI techniques have previously shown
success in the simpler game of heads-up limit Texas hold’em, where all bets are of a fixed size
resulting in just under 1014 decision points (11). By comparison, computers have exceeded
expert human performance in go (6), a perfect information game with approximately 10170
decision points (12). The imperfect information game HUNL is comparable in size to go, with
the number of decision points exceeding 10160 (13).
Imperfect information games require more complex reasoning than similarly sized perfect
information games. The correct decision at a particular moment depends upon the probability
distribution over private information that the opponent holds, which is revealed through their
past actions. However, how our opponent’s actions reveal that information depends upon their
knowledge of our private information and how our actions reveal it. This kind of recursive
reasoning is why one cannot easily reason about game situations in isolation, which is at the
heart of heuristic search methods for perfect information games. Competitive AI approaches
in imperfect information games typically reason about the entire game and produce a complete
strategy prior to play (14–16). Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (14,17,18) is one such
technique that uses self-play to do recursive reasoning through adapting its strategy against itself
over successive iterations. If the game is too large to be solved directly, the common response
is to solve a smaller, abstracted game. To play the original game, one translates situations and
actions from the original game to the abstract game.
Although this approach makes it feasible for programs to reason in a game like HUNL, it
does so by squeezing HUNL’s 10160 situations down to the order of 1014 abstract situations.
Likely as a result of this loss of information, such programs are behind expert human play. In
2015, the computer program Claudico lost to a team of professional poker players by a margin
of 91 mbb/g (19), which is a “huge margin of victory” (20). Furthermore, it has been recently
shown that abstraction-based programs from the Annual Computer Poker Competition have
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massive flaws (21). Four such programs (including top programs from the 2016 competition)
were evaluated using a local best-response technique that produces an approximate lower-bound
on how much a strategy can lose. All four abstraction-based programs are beatable by over
3,000 mbb/g, which is four times as large as simply folding each game.
DeepStack takes a fundamentally different approach. It continues to use the recursive rea-
soning of CFR to handle information asymmetry. However, it does not compute and store a
complete strategy prior to play and so has no need for explicit abstraction. Instead it consid-
ers each particular situation as it arises during play, but not in isolation. It avoids reasoning
about the entire remainder of the game by substituting the computation beyond a certain depth
with a fast approximate estimate. This estimate can be thought of as DeepStack’s intuition:
a gut feeling of the value of holding any possible private cards in any possible poker situa-
tion. Finally, DeepStack’s intuition, much like human intuition, needs to be trained. We train it
with deep learning (22) using examples generated from random poker situations. We show that
DeepStack is theoretically sound, produces strategies substantially more difficult to exploit than
abstraction-based techniques, and defeats professional poker players at HUNL with statistical
significance.
DeepStack
DeepStack is a general-purpose algorithm for a large class of sequential imperfect information
games. For clarity, we will describe its operation in the game of HUNL. The state of a poker
game can be split into the players’ private information, hands of two cards dealt face down, and
the public state, consisting of the cards laying face up on the table and the sequence of betting
actions made by the players. Possible sequences of public states in the game form a public tree
with every public state having an associated public subtree (Fig. 1).
A player’s strategy defines a probability distribution over valid actions for each decision
point, where a decision point is the combination of the public state and the hand for the acting
player. Given a player’s strategy, for any public state one can compute the player’s range,
which is the probability distribution over the player’s possible hands given that the public state
is reached.
Fixing both players’ strategies, the utility for a particular player at a terminal public state,
where the game has ended, is a bilinear function of both players’ ranges using a payoff matrix
determined by the rules of the game. The expected utility for a player at any other public
state, including the initial state, is the expected utility over reachable terminal states given the
players’ fixed strategies. A best-response strategy is one that maximizes a player’s expected
utility against an opponent strategy. In two-player zero-sum games, like HUNL, a solution
or Nash equilibrium strategy (23) maximizes the expected utility when playing against a best-
response opponent strategy. The exploitability of a strategy is the difference in expected utility
against its best-response opponent and the expected utility under a Nash equilibrium.
The DeepStack algorithm seeks to compute and play a low-exploitability strategy for the
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Figure 1: A portion of the public tree in HUNL. Nodes represent public states, whereas edges
represent actions: red and turquoise showing player betting actions, and green representing
public cards revealed by chance. The game ends at terminal nodes, shown as a chip with an
associated value. For terminal nodes where no player folded, the player whose private cards
form a stronger poker hand receives the value of the state.
game, i.e., solve for an approximate Nash equilibrium. DeepStack computes this strategy dur-
ing play only for the states of the public tree that actually arise. Although computed during
play, DeepStack’s strategy is static, albeit stochastic, because it is the result of a deterministic
computation that produces a probability distribution over the available actions.
The DeepStack algorithm (Fig. 2) is composed of three ingredients: a sound local strategy
computation for the current public state, depth-limited lookahead using a learned value func-
tion to avoid reasoning to the end of the game, and a restricted set of lookahead actions. At a
conceptual level these three ingredients describe heuristic search, which is responsible for many
of AI’s successes in perfect information games. Until DeepStack, no theoretically sound appli-
cation of heuristic search was known in imperfect information games. The heart of heuristic
search methods is the idea of “continual re-searching”, where a sound local search procedure is
invoked whenever the agent must act without retaining any memory of how or why it acted to
reach the current state. At the heart of DeepStack is continual re-solving, a sound local strategy
computation which only needs minimal memory of how and why it acted to reach the current
public state.
Continual re-solving. Suppose we have taken actions according to a particular solution strat-
egy but then in some public state forget this strategy. Can we reconstruct a solution strategy
for the subtree without having to solve the entire game again? We can, through the process of
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re-solving (17). We need to know both our range at the public state and a vector of expected
values achieved by the opponent under the previous solution for each opponent hand (24). With
these values, we can reconstruct a strategy for only the remainder of the game, which does not
increase our overall exploitability. Each value in the opponent’s vector is a counterfactual value,
a conditional “what-if” value that gives the expected value if the opponent reaches the public
state with a particular hand. The CFR algorithm also uses counterfactual values, and if we use
CFR as our solver, it is easy to compute the vector of opponent counterfactual values at any
public state.
Re-solving, however, begins with a strategy, whereas our goal is to avoid ever maintaining
a strategy for the entire game. We get around this by doing continual re-solving: reconstructing
a strategy by re-solving every time we need to act; never using the strategy beyond our next
action. To be able to re-solve at any public state, we need only keep track of our own range
and a suitable vector of opponent counterfactual values. These values must be an upper bound
on the value the opponent can achieve with each hand in the current public state, while being
no larger than the value the opponent could achieve had they deviated from reaching the public
state. This is an important relaxation of the counterfactual values typically used in re-solving,
with a proof of sufficiency included in our proof of Theorem 1 below (10).
At the start of the game, our range is uniform and the opponent counterfactual values are
initialized to the value of being dealt each private hand. When it is our turn to act we re-solve the
subtree at the current public state using the stored range and opponent values, and act according
to the computed strategy, discarding the strategy before we act again. After each action, either
by a player or chance dealing cards, we update our range and opponent counterfactual values
according to the following rules: (i) Own action: replace the opponent counterfactual values
with those computed in the re-solved strategy for our chosen action. Update our own range using
the computed strategy and Bayes’ rule. (ii) Chance action: replace the opponent counterfactual
values with those computed for this chance action from the last re-solve. Update our own range
by zeroing hands in the range that are impossible given new public cards. (iii) Opponent action:
no change to our range or the opponent values are required.
These updates ensure the opponent counterfactual values satisfy our sufficient conditions,
and the whole procedure produces arbitrarily close approximations of a Nash equilibrium (see
Theorem 1). Notice that continual re-solving never keeps track of the opponent’s range, instead
only keeping track of their counterfactual values. Furthermore, it never requires knowledge of
the opponent’s action to update these values, which is an important difference from traditional
re-solving. Both will prove key to making this algorithm efficient and avoiding any need for the
translation step required with action abstraction methods (25, 26).
Continual re-solving is theoretically sound, but by itself impractical. While it does not ever
maintain a complete strategy, re-solving itself is intractable except near the end of the game.
In order to make continual re-solving practical, we need to limit the depth and breadth of the
re-solved subtree.
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Limited depth lookahead via intuition. As in heuristic search for perfect information games,
we would like to limit the depth of the subtree we have to reason about when re-solving. How-
ever, in imperfect information games we cannot simply replace a subtree with a heuristic or
precomputed value. The counterfactual values at a public state are not fixed, but depend on how
players play to reach the public state, i.e., the players’ ranges (17). When using an iterative
algorithm, such as CFR, to re-solve, these ranges change on each iteration of the solver.
DeepStack overcomes this challenge by replacing subtrees beyond a certain depth with a
learned counterfactual value function that approximates the resulting values if that public state
were to be solved with the current iteration’s ranges. The inputs to this function are the ranges
for both players, as well as the pot size and public cards, which are sufficient to specify the
public state. The outputs are a vector for each player containing the counterfactual values of
holding each hand in that situation. In other words, the input is itself a description of a poker
game: the probability distribution of being dealt individual private hands, the stakes of the
game, and any public cards revealed; the output is an estimate of how valuable holding certain
cards would be in such a game. The value function is a sort of intuition, a fast estimate of the
value of finding oneself in an arbitrary poker situation. With a depth limit of four actions, this
approach reduces the size of the game for re-solving from 10160 decision points at the start of
the game down to no more than 1017 decision points. DeepStack uses a deep neural network as
its learned value function, which we describe later.
Sound reasoning. DeepStack’s depth-limited continual re-solving is sound. If DeepStack’s
intuition is “good” and “enough” computation is used in each re-solving step, then DeepStack
plays an arbitrarily close approximation to a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 If the values returned by the value function used when the depth limit is reached
have error less than , and T iterations of CFR are used to re-solve, then the resulting strategy’s
exploitability is less than k1 + k2/
√
T , where k1 and k2 are game-specific constants. For the
proof, see (10).
Sparse lookahead trees. The final ingredient in DeepStack is the reduction in the number of
actions considered so as to construct a sparse lookahead tree. DeepStack builds the lookahead
tree using only the actions fold (if valid), call, 2 or 3 bet actions, and all-in. This step voids
the soundness property of Theorem 1, but it allows DeepStack to play at conventional human
speeds. With sparse and depth-limited lookahead trees, the re-solved games have approximately
107 decision points, and are solved in under five seconds using a single NVIDIA GeForce GTX
1080 graphics card. We also use the sparse and depth-limited lookahead solver from the start of
the game to compute the opponent counterfactual values used to initialize DeepStack’s continual
re-solving.
Relationship to heuristic search in perfect information games. There are three key chal-
lenges that DeepStack overcomes to incorporate heuristic search ideas in imperfect information
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Figure 2: DeepStack overview. (A) DeepStack reasons in the public tree always producing
action probabilities for all cards it can hold in a public state. It maintains two vectors while
it plays: its own range and its opponent’s counterfactual values. As the game proceeds, its
own range is updated via Bayes’ rule using its computed action probabilities after it takes an
action. Opponent counterfactual values are updated as discussed under “Continual re-solving”.
To compute action probabilities when it must act, it performs a re-solve using its range and the
opponent counterfactual values. To make the re-solve tractable it restricts the available actions
of the players and lookahead is limited to the end of the round. During the re-solve, counterfac-
tual values for public states beyond its lookahead are approximated using DeepStack’s learned
evaluation function. (B) The evaluation function is represented with a neural network that takes
the public state and ranges from the current iteration as input and outputs counterfactual values
for both players (Fig. 3). (C) The neural network is trained prior to play by generating ran-
dom poker situations (pot size, board cards, and ranges) and solving them to produce training
examples. Complete pseudocode can be found in Algorithm S1 (10).
games. First, sound re-solving of public states cannot be done without knowledge of how and
why the players acted to reach the public state. Instead, two additional vectors, the agent’s range
and opponent counterfactual values, must be maintained to be used in re-solving. Second, re-
solving is an iterative process that traverses the lookahead tree multiple times instead of just
once. Each iteration requires querying the evaluation function again with different ranges for
every public state beyond the depth limit. Third, the evaluation function needed when the depth
limit is reached is conceptually more complicated than in the perfect information setting. Rather
than returning a single value given a single state in the game, the counterfactual value function
needs to return a vector of values given the public state and the players’ ranges. Because of this
complexity, to learn such a value function we use deep learning, which has also been successful
at learning complex evaluation functions in perfect information games (6).
Relationship to abstraction-based approaches. Although DeepStack uses ideas from ab-
straction, it is fundamentally different from abstraction-based approaches. DeepStack restricts
the number of actions in its lookahead trees, much like action abstraction (25, 26). However,
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each re-solve in DeepStack starts from the actual public state and so it always perfectly un-
derstands the current situation. The algorithm also never needs to use the opponent’s actual
action to obtain correct ranges or opponent counterfactual values, thereby avoiding translation
of opponent bets. We used hand clustering as inputs to our counterfactual value functions, much
like explicit card abstraction approaches (27, 28). However, our clustering is used to estimate
counterfactual values at the end of a lookahead tree rather than limiting what information the
player has about their cards when acting. We later show that these differences result in a strategy
substantially more difficult to exploit.
Deep Counterfactual Value Networks
Deep neural networks have proven to be powerful models and are responsible for major ad-
vances in image and speech recognition (29, 30), automated generation of music (31), and
game-playing (5, 6). DeepStack uses deep neural networks with a tailor-made architecture, as
the value function for its depth-limited lookahead (Fig. 3). Two separate networks are trained:
one estimates the counterfactual values after the first three public cards are dealt (flop network),
the other after dealing the fourth public card (turn network). An auxiliary network for values
before any public cards are dealt is used to speed up the re-solving for early actions (10).
Architecture. DeepStack uses a standard feedforward network with seven fully connected
hidden layers each with 500 nodes and parametric rectified linear units (32) for the output. This
architecture is embedded in an outer network that forces the counterfactual values to satisfy
the zero-sum property. The outer computation takes the estimated counterfactual values, and
computes a weighted sum using the two players’ input ranges resulting in separate estimates of
the game value. These two values should sum to zero, but may not. Half the actual sum is then
subtracted from the two players’ estimated counterfactual values. This entire computation is
differentiable and can be trained with gradient descent. The network’s inputs are the pot size as
a fraction of the players’ total stacks and an encoding of the players’ ranges as a function of the
public cards. The ranges are encoded by clustering hands into 1,000 buckets, as in traditional
abstraction methods (27, 28, 33), and input as a vector of probabilities over the buckets. The
output of the network are vectors of counterfactual values for each player and hand, interpreted
as fractions of the pot size.
Training. The turn network was trained by solving 10 million randomly generated poker turn
games. These turn games used randomly generated ranges, public cards, and a random pot
size (10). The target counterfactual values for each training game were generated by solving
the game with players’ actions restricted to fold, call, a pot-sized bet, and an all-in bet, but no
card abstraction. The flop network was trained similarly with 1 million randomly generated
flop games. However, the target counterfactual values were computed using our depth-limited
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Figure 3: Deep counterfactual value network. The inputs to the network are the pot size,
public cards, and the player ranges, which are first processed into hand clusters. The output
from the seven fully connected hidden layers is post-processed to guarantee the values satisfy
the zero-sum constraint, and then mapped back into a vector of counterfactual values.
solving procedure and our trained turn network. The networks were trained using the Adam
gradient descent optimization procedure (34) with a Huber loss (35).
Evaluating DeepStack
We evaluated DeepStack by playing it against a pool of professional poker players recruited
by the International Federation of Poker (36). Thirty-three players from 17 countries were
recruited. Each was asked to complete a 3,000 game match over a period of four weeks between
November 7th and December 12th, 2016. Cash incentives were given to the top three performers
($5,000, $2,500, and $1,250 CAD).
Evaluating performance in HUNL is challenging because of the large variance in per-game
outcomes owing to randomly dealt cards and stochastic choices made by the players. The better
player may lose in a short match simply because they were dealt weaker hands or their rare
bluffs were made at inopportune times. As seen in the Claudico match (20), even 80,000 games
may not be enough to statistically significantly separate players whose skill differs by a consid-
erable margin. We evaluate performance using AIVAT (37), a provably unbiased low-variance
technique for evaluating performance in imperfect information games based on carefully con-
structed control variates. AIVAT requires an estimated value of holding each hand in each public
state, and then uses the expected value changes that occur due to chance actions and actions of
9
Participant
Ha
nd
s 
pl
ay
ed
1250
1000
500
250
750
50
0
-500
-250
De
ep
St
ac
k 
w
in
 ra
te
 (m
bb
/g
)
1000
2000
3000
0
5 10 15 20 25 30
Figure 4: Performance of professional poker players against DeepStack. Performance esti-
mated with AIVAT along with a 95% confidence interval. The solid bars at the bottom show the
number of games the participant completed.
players with known strategies (i.e., DeepStack) to compute the control variate. DeepStack’s
own value function estimate is perfectly suited for AIVAT. Indeed, when used with AIVAT we
get an unbiased performance estimate with an impressive 85% reduction in standard deviation.
Thanks to this technique, we can show statistical significance (38) in matches with as few as
3,000 games.
In total 44,852 games were played by the thirty-three players with 11 players completing the
requested 3,000 games. Over all games played, DeepStack won 492 mbb/g. This is over 4 stan-
dard deviations away from zero, and so, highly significant. Note that professional poker players
consider 50 mbb/g a sizable margin. Using AIVAT to evaluate performance, we see DeepStack
was overall a bit lucky, with its estimated performance actually 486 mbb/g. However, as a lower
variance estimate, this margin is over 20 standard deviations from zero.
The performance of individual participants measured with AIVAT is summarized in Fig-
ure 4. Amongst those players that completed the requested 3,000 games, DeepStack is esti-
mated to be winning by 394 mbb/g, and individually beating 10 out of 11 such players by a
statistically significant margin. Only for the best performing player, still estimated to be losing
by 70 mbb/g, is the result not statistically significant. More details on the participants and their
results are presented in (10).
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Table 1: Exploitability bounds from Local Best Response. For all listed programs, the value
reported is the largest estimated exploitability when applying LBR using a variety of different
action sets. Table S2 gives a more complete presentation of these results (10). ‡: LBR was
unable to identify a positive lower bound for DeepStack’s exploitability.
Program LBR (mbb/g)
Hyperborean (2014) 4675
Slumbot (2016) 4020
Act1 (2016) 3302
Always Fold 750
DeepStack 0 ‡
Exploitability
The main goal of DeepStack is to approximate Nash equilibrium play, i.e., minimize exploitabil-
ity. While the exact exploitability of a HUNL poker strategy is intractable to compute, the re-
cent local best-response technique (LBR) can provide a lower bound on a strategy’s exploitabil-
ity (21) given full access to its action probabilities. LBR uses the action probabilities to compute
the strategy’s range at any public state. Using this range it chooses its response action from a
fixed set using the assumption that no more bets will be placed for the remainder of the game.
Thus it best-responds locally to the opponent’s actions, providing a lower bound on their overall
exploitability. As already noted, abstraction-based programs from the Annual Computer Poker
Competition are highly exploitable by LBR: four times more exploitable than folding every
game (Table 1). However, even under a variety of settings, LBR fails to exploit DeepStack at all
— itself losing by over 350 mbb/g to DeepStack (10). Either a more sophisticated lookahead is
required to identify DeepStack’s weaknesses or it is substantially less exploitable.
Discussion
DeepStack defeated professional poker players at HUNL with statistical significance (39), a
game that is similarly sized to go, but with the added complexity of imperfect information.
It achieves this goal with little domain knowledge and no training from expert human games.
The implications go beyond being a milestone for artificial intelligence. DeepStack represents
a paradigm shift in approximating solutions to large, sequential imperfect information games.
Abstraction and offline computation of complete strategies has been the dominant approach for
almost 20 years (33,40,41). DeepStack allows computation to be focused on specific situations
that arise when making decisions and the use of automatically trained value functions. These
are two of the core principles that have powered successes in perfect information games, albeit
conceptually simpler to implement in those settings. As a result, the gap between the largest
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perfect and imperfect information games to have been mastered is mostly closed.
With many real world problems involving information asymmetry, DeepStack also has im-
plications for seeing powerful AI applied more in settings that do not fit the perfect information
assumption. The abstraction paradigm for handling imperfect information has shown promise
in applications like defending strategic resources (42) and robust decision making as needed
for medical treatment recommendations (43). DeepStack’s continual re-solving paradigm will
hopefully open up many more possibilities.
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Supplementary Materials for
DeepStack: Expert-Level AI in No-Limit Poker
Game of Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold’em
Heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em (HUNL) is a two-player poker game. It is a repeated game, in
which the two players play a match of individual games, usually called hands, while alternating
who is the dealer. In each of the individual games, one player will win some number of chips
from the other player, and the goal is to win as many chips as possible over the course of the
match.
Each individual game begins with both players placing a number of chips in the pot: the
player in the dealer position puts in the small blind, and the other player puts in the big blind,
which is twice the small blind amount. During a game, a player can only wager and win up
to a fixed amount known as their stack. In the particular format of HUNL used in the Annual
Computer Poker Competition (50) and this article, the big blind is 100 chips and the stack is
20,000 chips or 200 big blinds. Resetting the stacks after each game is called “Doyle’s Game”,
named for the professional poker player Doyle Brunson who publicized this variant (25). It
is used in the Annual Computer Poker Competitions because it allows for each game to be an
independent sample of the same game.
A game of HUNL progresses through four rounds: the pre-flop, flop, turn, and river. Each
round consists of cards being dealt followed by player actions in the form of wagers as to who
will hold the strongest hand at the end of the game. In the pre-flop, each player is given two
private cards, unobserved by their opponent. In the later rounds, cards are dealt face-up in the
center of the table, called public cards. A total of five public cards are revealed over the four
rounds: three on the flop, one on the turn, and one on the river.
After the cards for the round are dealt, players alternate taking actions of three types: fold,
call, or raise. A player folds by declining to match the last opponent wager, thus forfeiting to
the opponent all chips in the pot and ending the game with no player revealing their private
cards. A player calls by adding chips into the pot to match the last opponent wager, which
causes the next round to begin. A player raises by adding chips into the pot to match the last
wager followed by adding additional chips to make a wager of their own. At the beginning of
a round when there is no opponent wager yet to match, the raise action is called bet, and the
call action is called check, which only ends the round if both players check. An all-in wager is
one involving all of the chips remaining the player’s stack. If the wager is called, there is no
further wagering in later rounds. The size of any other wager can be any whole number of chips
remaining in the player’s stack, as long as it is not smaller than the last wager in the current
round or the big blind.
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The dealer acts first in the pre-flop round and must decide whether to fold, call, or raise
the opponent’s big blind bet. In all subsequent rounds, the non-dealer acts first. If the river
round ends with no player previously folding to end the game, the outcome is determined by a
showdown. Each player reveals their two private cards and the player that can form the strongest
five-card poker hand (see “List of poker hand categories” on Wikipedia; accessed January 1,
2017) wins all the chips in the pot. To form their hand each player may use any cards from their
two private cards and the five public cards. At the end of the game, whether ended by fold or
showdown, the players will swap who is the dealer and begin the next game.
Since the game can be played for different stakes, such as a big blind being worth $0.01
or $1 or $1000, players commonly measure their performance over a match as their average
number of big blinds won per game. Researchers have standardized on the unit milli-big-blinds
per game, or mbb/g, where one milli-big-blind is one thousandth of one big blind. A player
that always folds will lose 750 mbb/g (by losing 1000 mbb as the big blind and 500 as the
small blind). A human rule-of-thumb is that a professional should aim to win at least 50 mbb/g
from their opponents. Milli-big-blinds per game is also used as a unit of exploitability, when it is
computed as the expected loss per game against a worst-case opponent. In the poker community,
it is common to use big blinds per one hundred games (bb/100) to measure win rates, where 10
mbb/g equals 1 bb/100.
Poker Glossary
all-in A wager of the remainder of a player’s stack. The opponent’s only response can be call
or fold.
bet The first wager in a round; putting more chips into the pot.
big blind Initial wager made by the non-dealer before any cards are dealt. The big blind is
twice the size of the small blind.
call Putting enough chips into the pot to match the current wager; ends the round.
check Declining to wager any chips when not facing a bet.
chip Marker representing value used for wagers; all wagers must be a whole numbers of chips.
dealer The player who puts the small blind into the pot. Acts first on round 1, and second on
the later rounds. Traditionally, they would distribute public and private cards from the
deck.
flop The second round; can refer to either the 3 revealed public cards, or the betting round after
these cards are revealed.
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fold Give up on the current game, forfeiting all wagers placed in the pot. Ends a player’s
participation in the game.
hand Many different meanings: the combination of the best 5 cards from the public cards and
private cards, just the private cards themselves, or a single game of poker (for clarity, we
avoid this final meaning).
milli-big-blinds per game (mbb/g) Average winning rate over a number of games, measured
in thousandths of big blinds.
pot The collected chips from all wagers.
pre-flop The first round; can refer to either the hole cards, or the betting round after these cards
are distributed.
private cards Cards dealt face down, visible only to one player. Used in combination with
public cards to create a hand. Also called hole cards.
public cards Cards dealt face up, visible to all players. Used in combination with private cards
to create a hand. Also called community cards.
raise Increasing the size of a wager in a round, putting more chips into the pot than is required
to call the current bet.
river The fourth and final round; can refer to either the 1 revealed public card, or the betting
round after this card is revealed.
showdown After the river, players who have not folded show their private cards to determine
the player with the best hand. The player with the best hand takes all of the chips in the
pot.
small blind Initial wager made by the dealer before any cards are dealt. The small blind is half
the size of the big blind.
stack The maximum amount of chips a player can wager or win in a single game.
turn The third round; can refer to either the 1 revealed public card, or the betting round after
this card is revealed.
Performance Against Professional Players
To assess DeepStack relative to expert humans, players were recruited with assistance from
the International Federation of Poker (36) to identify and recruit professional poker players
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through their member nation organizations. We only selected participants from those who self-
identified as a “professional poker player” during registration. Players were given four weeks to
complete a 3,000 game match. To incentivize players, monetary prizes of $5,000, $2,500, and
$1,250 (CAD) were awarded to the top three players (measured by AIVAT) that completed their
match. The participants were informed of all of these details when they registered to participate.
Matches were played between November 7th and December 12th, 2016, and run using an online
user interface (51) where players had the option to play up to four games simultaneously as is
common in online poker sites. A total of 33 players from 17 countries played against DeepStack.
DeepStack’s performance against each individual is presented in Table 2, with complete game
histories available as part of the supplementary online materials.
Local Best Response of DeepStack
The goal of DeepStack, and much of the work on AI in poker, is to approximate a Nash equi-
librium, i.e., produce a strategy with low exploitability. The size of HUNL makes an explicit
best-response computation intractable and so exact exploitability cannot be measured. A com-
mon alternative is to play two strategies against each other. However, head-to-head performance
in imperfect information games has repeatedly been shown to be a poor estimation of equilib-
rium approximation quality. For example, consider an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in the
game of Rock-Paper-Scissors playing against a strategy that almost always plays “rock”. The
results are a tie, but their playing strengths in terms of exploitability are vastly different. This
same issue has been seen in heads-up limit Texas hold’em as well (Johanson, IJCAI 2011),
where the relationship between head-to-head play and exploitability, which is tractable in that
game, is indiscernible. The introduction of local best response (LBR) as a technique for finding
a lower-bound on a strategy’s exploitability gives evidence of the same issue existing in HUNL.
Act1 and Slumbot (second and third place in the previous ACPC) were statistically indistin-
guishable in head-to-head play (within 20 mbb/g), but Act1 is 1300mbb/g less exploitable as
measured by LBR. This is why we use LBR to evaluate DeepStack.
LBR is a simple, yet powerful, technique to produce a lower bound on a strategy’s ex-
ploitability in HUNL (21) . It explores a fixed set of options to find a “locally” good action
against the strategy. While it seems natural that more options would be better, this is not always
true. More options may cause it to find a locally good action that misses out on a future oppor-
tunity to exploit an even larger flaw in the opponent. In fact, LBR sometimes results in larger
lower bounds when not considering any bets in the early rounds, so as to increase the size of the
pot and thus the magnitude of a strategy’s future mistakes. LBR was recently used to show that
abstraction-based agents are significantly exploitable (see Table 3). The first three strategies
are submissions from recent Annual Computer Poker Competitions. They all use both card and
action abstraction and were found to be even more exploitable than simply folding every game
in all tested cases. The strategy “Full Cards” does not use any card abstraction, but uses only
the sparse fold, call, pot-sized bet, all-in betting abstraction using hard translation (26). Due
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Table 2: Results against professional poker players estimated with AIVAT (Luck Adjusted Win
Rate) and chips won (Unadjusted Win Rate), both measured in mbb/g. Recall 10mbb/g equals
1bb/100. Each estimate is followed by a 95% confidence interval. ‡ marks a participant who
completed the 3000 games after their allotted four week period.
Player Rank Hands
Luck Adjusted
Win Rate
Unadjusted
Win Rate
Martin Sturc 1 3000 70 ± 119 −515 ± 575
Stanislav Voloshin 2 3000 126 ± 103 −65 ± 648
Prakshat Shrimankar 3 3000 139 ± 97 174 ± 667
Ivan Shabalin 4 3000 170 ± 99 153 ± 633
Lucas Schaumann 5 3000 207 ± 87 160 ± 576
Phil Laak 6 3000 212 ± 143 774 ± 677
Kaishi Sun 7 3000 363 ± 116 5 ± 729
Dmitry Lesnoy 8 3000 411 ± 138 −87 ± 753
Antonio Parlavecchio 9 3000 618 ± 212 1096 ± 962
Muskan Sethi 10 3000 1009 ± 184 2144 ± 1019
Pol Dmit‡ – 3000 1008 ± 156 883 ± 793
Tsuneaki Takeda – 1901 628 ± 231 −332 ± 1228
Youwei Qin – 1759 1311 ± 331 1958 ± 1799
Fintan Gavin – 1555 635 ± 278 −26 ± 1647
Giedrius Talacka – 1514 1063 ± 338 459 ± 1707
Juergen Bachmann – 1088 527 ± 198 1769 ± 1662
Sergey Indenok – 852 881 ± 371 253 ± 2507
Sebastian Schwab – 516 1086 ± 598 1800 ± 2162
Dara O’Kearney – 456 78 ± 250 223 ± 1688
Roman Shaposhnikov – 330 131 ± 305 −898 ± 2153
Shai Zurr – 330 499 ± 360 1154 ± 2206
Luca Moschitta – 328 444 ± 580 1438 ± 2388
Stas Tishekvich – 295 −45 ± 433 −346 ± 2264
Eyal Eshkar – 191 18 ± 608 715 ± 4227
Jefri Islam – 176 997 ± 700 3822 ± 4834
Fan Sun – 122 531 ± 774 −1291 ± 5456
Igor Naumenko – 102 −137 ± 638 851 ± 1536
Silvio Pizzarello – 90 1500 ± 2100 5134 ± 6766
Gaia Freire – 76 369 ± 136 138 ± 694
Alexander Bo¨s – 74 487 ± 756 1 ± 2628
Victor Santos – 58 475 ± 462 −1759 ± 2571
Mike Phan – 32 −1019 ± 2352 −11223 ± 18235
Juan Manuel Pastor – 7 2744 ± 3521 7286 ± 9856
Human Professionals 44852 486 ± 40 492 ± 220
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Table 3: Exploitability lower bound of different programs using local best response (LBR).
LBR evaluates only the listed actions in each round as shown in each row. F, C, P, A, refer
to fold, call, a pot-sized bet, and all-in, respectively. 56bets includes the actions fold, call and
56 equidistant pot fractions as defined in the original LBR paper (21). ‡: Always Fold checks
when not facing a bet, and so it cannot be maximally exploited without a betting action.
Local best response performance (mbb/g)
LBR Settings
Pre-flop F, C C C C
Flop F, C C C 56bets
Turn F, C F, C, P, A 56bets F, C
River F, C F, C, P, A 56bets F, C
Hyperborean (2014) 721 ± 56 3852 ± 141 4675 ± 152 983 ± 95
Slumbot (2016) 522 ± 50 4020 ± 115 3763 ± 104 1227 ± 79
Act1 (2016) 407 ± 47 2597 ± 140 3302 ± 122 847 ± 78
Always Fold ‡250 ± 0 750 ± 0 750 ± 0 750 ± 0
Full Cards [100 BB] -424 ± 37 -536 ± 87 2403 ± 87 1008 ± 68
DeepStack -428 ± 87 -383 ± 219 -775 ± 255 -602 ± 214
to computation and memory requirements, we computed this strategy only for a smaller stack
of 100 big blinds. Still, this strategy takes almost 2TB of memory and required approximately
14 CPU years to solve. Naturally, it cannot be exploited by LBR within the betting abstraction,
but it is heavily exploitable in settings using other betting actions that require it to translate its
opponent’s actions, again losing more than if it folded every game.
As for DeepStack, under all tested settings of LBR’s available actions, it fails to find any
exploitable flaw. In fact, it is losing 350 mbb/g or more to DeepStack. Of particular interest
is the final column aimed to exploit DeepStack’s flop strategy. The flop is where DeepStack is
most dependent on its counterfactual value networks to provide it estimates through the end of
the game. While these experiments do not prove that DeepStack is flawless, it does suggest its
flaws require a more sophisticated search procedure than what is needed to exploit abstraction-
based programs.
DeepStack Implementation Details
Here we describe the specifics for how DeepStack employs continual re-solving and how its
deep counterfactual value networks were trained.
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Table 4: Lookahead re-solving specifics by round. The abbreviations of F, C, ½P, P, 2P, and
A refer to fold, call, half of a pot-sized bet, a pot-sized bet, twice a pot-sized bet, and all in,
respectively. The final column specifies which neural network was used when the depth limit
was exceeded: the flop, turn, or the auxiliary network.
CFR Omitted First Second Remaining NN
Round Iterations Iterations Action Action Actions Eval
Pre-flop 1000 980 F, C, ½P, P, A F, C, ½P, P, 2P, A F, C, P, A Aux/Flop
Flop 1000 500 F, C, ½P, P, A F, C, P, A F, C, P, A Turn
Turn 1000 500 F, C, ½P, P, A F, C, P, A F, C, P, A —
River 2000 1000 F, C, ½P, P, 2P, A F, C, ½P, P, 2P, A F, C, P, A —
Continual Re-Solving
As with traditional re-solving, the re-solving step of the DeepStack algorithm solves an aug-
mented game. The augmented game is designed to produce a strategy for the player such that
the bounds for the opponent’s counterfactual values are satisfied. DeepStack uses a modification
of the original CFR-D gadget (17) for its augmented game, as discussed below. While the max-
margin gadget (46) is designed to improve the performance of poor strategies for abstracted
agents near the end of the game, the CFR-D gadget performed better in early testing.
The algorithm DeepStack uses to solve the augmented game is a hybrid of vanilla CFR
(14) and CFR+ (52), which uses regret matching+ like CFR+, but does uniform weighting and
simultaneous updates like vanilla CFR. When computing the final average strategy and average
counterfactual values, we omit the early iterations of CFR in the averages.
A major design goal for DeepStack’s implementation was to typically play at least as fast
as a human would using commodity hardware and a single GPU. The degree of lookahead tree
sparsity and the number of re-solving iterations are the principle decisions that we tuned to
achieve this goal. These properties were chosen separately for each round to achieve a consis-
tent speed on each round. Note that DeepStack has no fixed requirement on the density of its
lookahead tree besides those imposed by hardware limitations and speed constraints.
The lookahead trees vary in the actions available to the player acting, the actions available
for the opponent’s response, and the actions available to either player for the remainder of the
round. We use the end of the round as our depth limit, except on the turn when the remainder
of the game is solved. On the pre-flop and flop, we use trained counterfactual value networks
to return values after the flop or turn card(s) are revealed. Only applying our value function
to public states at the start of a round is particularly convenient in that that we don’t need to
include the bet faced as an input to the function. Table 4 specifies lookahead tree properties for
each round.
The pre-flop round is particularly expensive as it requires enumerating all 22,100 possible
public cards on the flop and evaluating each with the flop network. To speed up pre-flop play, we
trained an additional auxiliary neural network to estimate the expected value of the flop network
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Table 5: Absolute (L1), Euclidean (L2), and maximum absolute (L∞) errors, in mbb/g, of
counterfactual values computed with 1,000 iterations of CFR on sparse trees, averaged over
100 random river situations. The ground truth values were estimated by solving the game with
9 betting options and 4,000 iterations (first row).
Betting Size L1 L2 L∞
F, C, Min, ¼P, ½P, ¾P, P, 2P, 3P, 10P, A [4,000 iterations] 555k 0.0 0.0 0.0
F, C, Min, ¼P, ½P, ¾P, P, 2P, 3P, 10P, A 555k 18.06 0.891 0.2724
F, C, 2P, A 48k 64.79 2.672 0.3445
F, C, ½P, A 100k 58.24 3.426 0.7376
F, C, P, A 61k 25.51 1.272 0.3372
F, C, ½P, P, A 126k 41.42 1.541 0.2955
F, C, P, 2P, A 204k 27.69 1.390 0.2543
F, C, ½P, P, 2P, A 360k 20.96 1.059 0.2653
over all possible flops. However, we only used this network during the initial omitted iterations
of CFR. During the final iterations used to compute the average strategy and counterfactual
values, we did the expensive enumeration and flop network evaluations. Additionally, we cache
the re-solving result for every observed pre-flop situation. When the same betting sequence
occurs again, we simply reuse the cached results rather than recomputing. For the turn round,
we did not use a neural network after the final river card, but instead solved to the end of the
game. However, we used a bucketed abstraction for all actions on the river. For acting on the
river, the re-solving includes the remainder of the game and so no counterfactual value network
was used.
Actions in Sparse Lookahead Trees. DeepStack’s sparse lookahead trees use only a small
subset of the game’s possible actions. The first layer of actions immediately after the current
public state defines the options considered for DeepStack’s next action. The only purpose of the
remainder of the tree is to estimate counterfactual values for the first layer during the CFR algo-
rithm. Table 5 presents how well counterfactual values can be estimated using sparse lookahead
trees with various action subsets.
The results show that the F, C, P, A, actions provide an excellent tradeoff between computa-
tional requirements via the size of the solved lookahead tree and approximation quality. Using
more actions quickly increases the size of the lookahead tree, but does not substantially improve
errors. Alternatively, using a single betting action that is not one pot has a small effect on the
size of the tree, but causes a substantial error increase.
To further investigate the effect of different betting options, Table 6 presents the results of
evaluating DeepStack with different action sets using LBR. We used setting of LBR that proved
most effective against the default set of DeepStack actions (see Table 4). While the extent of
the variance in the 10,000 hand evaluation shown in Table 6 prevents us from declaring a best
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Table 6: Performance of LBR exploitation of DeepStack with different actions allowed on the
first level of its lookahead tree using the best LBR configuration against the default version of
DeepStack. LBR cannot exploit DeepStack regardless of its available actions.
First level actions LBR performance
F, C, P, A -479 ± 216
Default -383 ± 219
F, C, ½P, P, 1½P, 2P, A -406 ± 218
set of actions with certainty, the crucial point is that LBR is significantly losing to each of them,
and that we can produce play that is difficult to exploit even choosing from a small number of
actions. Furthermore, the improvement of a small number of additional actions is not dramatic.
Opponent Ranges in Re-Solving. Continual re-solving does not require keeping track of
the opponent’s range. The re-solving step essentially reconstructs a suitable range using the
bounded counterfactual values. In particular, the CFR-D gadget does this by giving the oppo-
nent the option, after being dealt a uniform random hand, of terminating the game (T) instead
of following through with the game (F), allowing them to simply earn that hand’s bound on
its counterfactual value. Only hands which are valuable to bring into the subgame will then
be observed by the re-solving player. However, this process of the opponent learning which
hands to follow through with can make re-solving require many iterations. An estimate of the
opponent’s range can be used to effectively warm-start the choice of opponent ranges, and help
speed up the re-solving.
One conservative option is to replace the uniform random deal of opponent hands with any
distribution over hands as long as it assigns non-zero probability to every hand. For example,
we could linearly combine an estimated range of the opponent from the previous re-solve (with
weight b) and a uniform range (with weight 1− b). This approach still has the same theoretical
guarantees as re-solving, but can reach better approximate solutions in fewer iterations. Another
option is more aggressive and sacrifices the re-solving guarantees when the opponent’s range
estimate is wrong. It forces the opponent with probability b to follow through into the game
with a hand sampled from the estimated opponent range. With probability 1− b they are given
a uniform random hand and can choose to terminate or follow through. This could prevent the
opponent’s strategy from reconstructing a correct range, but can speed up re-solving further
when we have a good opponent range estimate.
DeepStack uses an estimated opponent range during re-solving only for the first action of a
round, as this is the largest lookahead tree to re-solve. The range estimate comes from the last
re-solve in the previous round. When DeepStack is second to act in the round, the opponent
has already acted, biasing their range, so we use the conservative approach. When DeepStack
is first to act, though, the opponent could only have checked or called since our last re-solve.
Thus, the lookahead has an estimated range following their action. So in this case, we use the
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Table 7: Thinking times for both humans and DeepStack. DeepStack’s extremely fast pre-flop
speed shows that pre-flop situations often resulted in cache hits.
Thinking Time (s)
Humans DeepStack
Round Median Mean Median Mean
Pre-flop 10.3 16.2 0.04 0.2
Flop 9.1 14.6 5.9 5.9
Turn 8.0 14.0 5.4 5.5
River 9.5 16.2 2.2 2.1
Per Action 9.6 15.4 2.3 3.0
Per Hand 22.0 37.4 5.7 7.2
aggressive approach. In both cases, we set b = 0.9.
Speed of Play. The re-solving computation and neural network evaluations are both imple-
mented in Torch7 (53) and run on a single NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 graphics card. This
makes it possible to do fast batched calls to the counterfactual value networks for multiple
public subtrees at once, which is key to making DeepStack fast.
Table 7 reports the average times between the end of the previous (opponent or chance)
action and submitting the next action by both humans and DeepStack in our study. DeepStack,
on average, acted considerably faster than our human players. It should be noted that some
human players were playing up to four games simultaneously (although few players did more
than two), and so the human players may have been focused on another game when it became
their turn to act.
Deep Counterfactual Value Networks
DeepStack uses two counterfactual value networks, one for the flop and one for the turn, as
well as an auxiliary network that gives counterfactual values at the end of the pre-flop. In
order to train the networks, we generated random poker situations at the start of the flop and
turn. Each poker situation is defined by the pot size, ranges for both players, and dealt public
cards. The complete betting history is not necessary as the pot and ranges are a sufficient
representation. The output of the network are vectors of counterfactual values, one for each
player. The output values are interpreted as fractions of the pot size to improve generalization
across poker situations.
The training situations were generated by first sampling a pot size from a fixed distribution
which was designed to approximate observed pot sizes from older HUNL programs.2 The
2The fixed distribution selects an interval from the set of intervals {[100, 100), [200, 400), [400, 2000),
25
player ranges for the training situations need to cover the space of possible ranges that CFR
might encounter during re-solving, not just ranges that are likely part of a solution. So we
generated pseudo-random ranges that attempt to cover the space of possible ranges. We used
a recursive procedure R(S, p), that assigns probabilities to the hands in the set S that sum to
probability p, according to the following procedure.
1. If |S| = 1, then Pr(s) = p.
2. Otherwise,
(a) Choose p1 uniformly at random from the interval (0, p), and let p2 = p− p1.
(b) Let S1 ⊂ S and S2 = S \ S1 such that |S1| = b|S|/2c and all of the hands in S1
have a hand strength no greater than hands in S2. Hand strength is the probability
of a hand beating a uniformly selected random hand from the current public state.
(c) Use R(S1, p1) and R(S2, p2) to assign probabilities to hands in S = S1
⋃
S2.
Generating a range involves invokingR(all hands, 1). To obtain the target counterfactual values
for the generated poker situations for the main networks, the situations were approximately
solved using 1,000 iterations of CFR+ with only betting actions fold, call, a pot-sized bet, and
all-in. For the turn network, ten million poker turn situations (from after the turn card is dealt)
were generated and solved with 6,144 CPU cores of the Calcul Que´bec MP2 research cluster,
using over 175 core years of computation time. For the flop network, one million poker flop
situations (from after the flop cards are dealt) were generated and solved. These situations were
solved using DeepStack’s depth limited solver with the turn network used for the counterfactual
values at public states immediately after the turn card. We used a cluster of 20 GPUS and
one-half of a GPU year of computation time. For the auxiliary network, ten million situations
were generated and the target values were obtained by enumerating all 22,100 possible flops
and averaging the counterfactual values from the flop network’s output.
Neural Network Training. All networks were trained using built-in Torch7 libraries, with
the Adam stochastic gradient descent procedure (34) minimizing the average of the Huber
losses (35) over the counterfactual value errors. Training used a mini-batch size of 1,000, and
a learning rate 0.001, which was decreased to 0.0001 after the first 200 epochs. Networks were
trained for approximately 350 epochs over two days on a single GPU, and the epoch with the
lowest validation loss was chosen.
Neural Network Range Representation. In order to improve generalization over input player
ranges, we map the distribution of individual hands (combinations of public and private cards)
into distributions of buckets. The buckets were generated using a clustering-based abstraction
[2000, 6000), [6000, 19950]} with uniform probability, followed by uniformly selecting an integer from within
the chosen interval.
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Figure 5: Huber loss with different numbers of hidden layers in the neural network.
technique, which cluster strategically similar hands using k-means clustering with earth mover’s
distance over hand-strength-like features (28, 54). For both the turn and flop networks we used
1,000 clusters and map the original ranges into distributions over these clusters as the first layer
of the neural network (see Figure 3 of the main article). This bucketing step was not used on the
auxiliary network as there are only 169 strategically distinct hands pre-flop, making it feasible
to input the distribution over distinct hands directly.
Neural Network Accuracies. The turn network achieved an average Huber loss of 0.016 of
the pot size on the training set and 0.026 of the pot size on the validation set. The flop network,
with a much smaller training set, achieved an average Huber loss of 0.008 of the pot size on the
training set, but 0.034 of the pot size on the validation set. Finally, the auxiliary network had
average Huber losses of 0.000053 and 0.000055 on the training and validation set, respectively.
Note that there are, in fact, multiple Nash equilibrium solutions to these poker situations, with
each giving rise to different counterfactual value vectors. So, these losses may overestimate the
true loss as the network may accurately model a different equilibrium strategy.
Number of Hidden Layers. We observed in early experiments that the neural network had
a lower validation loss with an increasing number of hidden layers. From these experiments,
we chose to use seven hidden layers in an attempt to tradeoff accuracy, speed of execution, and
the available memory on the GPU. The result of a more thorough experiment examining the
turn network accuracy as a function of the number of hidden layers is in Figure 5. It appears
that seven hidden layers is more than strictly necessary as the validation error does not improve
much beyond five. However, all of these architectures were trained using the same ten million
turn situations. With more training data it would not be surprising to see the larger networks see
a further reduction in loss due to their richer representation power.
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Proof of Theorem 1
The formal proof of Theorem 1, which establishes the soundness of DeepStack’s depth-limited
continual re-solving, is conceptually easy to follow. It requires three parts. First, we establish
that the exploitability introduced in a re-solving step has two linear components; one due to ap-
proximately solving the subgame, and one due to the error in DeepStack’s counterfactual value
network (see Lemmas 1 through 5). Second, we enable estimates of subgame counterfactual
values that do not arise from actual subgame strategies (see Lemma 6). Together, parts one and
two enable us to use DeepStack’s counterfactual value network for a single re-solve.3 Finally,
we show that using the opponent’s values from the best action, rather than the observed action,
does not increase overall exploitability (see Lemma 7). This allows us to carry forward esti-
mates of the opponent’s counterfactual value, enabling continual re-solving. Put together, these
three parts bound the error after any finite number of continual re-solving steps, concluding the
proof. We now formalize each step.
There are a number of concepts we use throughout this section. We use the notation from
Burch et al. (17) without any introduction here. We assume player 1 is performing the continual
re-solving. We call player 2 the opponent. We only consider the re-solve player’s strategy σ, as
the opponent is always using a best response to σ. All values are considered with respect to the
opponent, unless specifically stated. We say σ is -exploitable if the opponent’s best response
value against σ is no more than  away from the game value for the opponent.
A public state S corresponds to the root of an imperfect information subgame. We write IS2
for the collection of player 2 information sets in S. Let G〈S, σ, w〉 be the subtree gadget game
(the re-solving game of Burch et al. (17)), where S is some public state, σ is used to get player 1
reach probabilities piσ−2(h) for each h ∈ S, and w is a vector where wI gives the value of player
2 taking the terminate action (T) from information set I ∈ IS2 . Let
BVI(σ) = max
σ∗2
∑
h∈I
piσ−2(h)u
σ,σ∗2 (h)/piσ−2(I),
be the counterfactual value for I given we play σ and our opponent is playing a best response.
For a subtree strategy σS , we write σ → σS for the strategy that plays according to σS for any
state in the subtree and according to σ otherwise. For the gadget game G〈S, σ, w〉, the gadget
value of a subtree strategy σS is defined to be:
GVSw,σ(σ
S) =
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,BVI(σ → σS)),
and the underestimation error is defined to be:
USw,σ = min
σS
GVSw,σ(σ
S)−
∑
I∈IS2
wI .
3The first part is a generalization and improvement on the re-solving exploitability bound given by Theorem 3
in Burch et al. (17), and the second part generalizes the bound on decomposition regret given by Theorem 2 of the
same work.
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Lemma 1 The game value of a gadget game G〈S, σ, w〉 is∑
I∈IS2
wI + USw,σ.
Proof. Let σ˜S2 be a gadget game strategy for player 2 which must choose from the F and T
actions at starting information set I . Let u˜ be the utility function for the gadget game.
min
σS1
max
σ˜S2
u˜(σS1 , σ˜
S
2 ) = min
σS1
max
σS2
∑
I∈IS2
piσ−2(I)∑
I′∈IS2 pi
σ
−2(I ′)
max
a∈{F,T}
u˜σ
S
(I, a)
= min
σS1
max
σS2
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,
∑
h∈I
piσ−2(h)u
σS(h))
A best response can maximize utility at each information set independently:
= min
σS1
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,max
σS2
∑
h∈I
piσ−2(h)u
σS(h))
= min
σS1
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,BVI(σ → σS1 ))
= USw,σ +
∑
I∈IS2
wI
Lemma 2 If our strategy σS is -exploitable in the gadget game G〈S, σ, w〉, then GVSw,σ(σS) ≤∑
I∈IS2 wI + U
S
w,σ + 
Proof. This follows from Lemma 1 and the definitions of -Nash, USw,σ, and GV
S
w,σ(σ
S).
Lemma 3 Given an O-exploitable σ in the original game, if we replace a subgame with a
strategy σS such that BVI(σ → σS) ≤ wI for all I ∈ IS2 , then the new combined strategy has
an exploitability no more than O + EXPSw,σ where
EXPSw,σ =
∑
I∈IS2
max(BVI(σ), wI)−
∑
I∈IS2
BVI(σ)
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Proof. We only care about the information sets where the opponent’s counterfactual value
increases, and a worst case upper bound occurs when the opponent best response would reach
every such information set with probability 1, and never reach information sets where the value
decreased.
Let Z[S] ⊆ Z be the set of terminal states reachable from some h ∈ S and let v2 be the
game value of the full game for player 2. Let σ2 be a best response to σ and let σS2 be the part
of σ2 that plays in the subtree rooted at S. Then necessarily σS2 achieves counterfactual value
BVI(σ) at each I ∈ IS2 .
max
σ∗2
(u(σ → σS, σ∗2))
= max
σ∗2
[ ∑
z∈Z[S]
piσ→σ
S
−2 (z)pi
σ∗2
2 (z)u(z) +
∑
z∈Z\Z[S]
piσ→σ
S
−2 (z)pi
σ∗2
2 (z)u(z)
]
= max
σ∗2
[ ∑
z∈Z[S]
piσ→σ
S
−2 (z)pi
σ∗2
2 (z)u(z)−
∑
z∈Z[S]
piσ−2(z)pi
σ∗2→σS2
2 (z)u(z)
+
∑
z∈Z[S]
piσ−2(z)pi
σ∗2→σS2
2 (z)u(z) +
∑
z∈Z\Z[S]
piσ−2(z)pi
σ∗2
2 (z)u(z)
]
≤ max
σ∗2
[ ∑
z∈Z[S]
piσ→σ
S
−2 (z)pi
σ∗2
2 (z)u(z)−
∑
z∈Z[S]
piσ−2(z)pi
σ∗2→σS2
2 (z)u(z)
]
+ max
σ∗2
[ ∑
z∈Z[S]
piσ−2(z)pi
σ∗2→σS2
2 (z)u(z) +
∑
z∈Z\Z[S]
piσ−2(z)pi
σ∗2
2 (z)u(z)
]
≤ max
σ∗2
[∑
I∈IS2
∑
h∈I
piσ−2(h)pi
σ∗2
2 (h)u
σS ,σ∗2 (h)
−
∑
I∈IS2
∑
h∈I
piσ−2(h)pi
σ∗2
2 (h)u
σ,σS2 (h)
]
+ max
σ∗2
(u(σ, σ∗2))
By perfect recall pi2(h) = pi2(I) for each h ∈ I:
≤ max
σ∗2
[∑
I∈IS2
pi
σ∗2
2 (I)
(∑
h∈I
piσ−2(h)u
σS ,σ∗2 (h)−
∑
h∈I
piσ−2(h)u
σ,σS2 (h)
)]
+ v2 + O
= max
σ∗2
[∑
I∈IS2
pi
σ∗2
2 (I)pi
σ
−2(I)
(
BVI(σ → σS)− BVI(σ)
)]
+ v2 + O
≤
[∑
I∈IS2
max(BVI(σ → σS)− BVI(σ), 0)
]
+ v2 + O
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≤
[∑
I∈IS2
max(wI − BVI(σ),BVI(σ)− BVI(σ))
]
+ v2 + O
=
[∑
I∈IS2
max(BVI(σ), wI)−
∑
I∈IS2
BVI(σ)
]
+ v2 + O
Lemma 4 Given an O-exploitable σ in the original game, if we replace the strategy in a sub-
game with a strategy σS that is S-exploitable in the gadget game G〈S, σ, w〉, then the new
combined strategy has an exploitability no more than O + EXPSw,σ + U
S
w,σ + S .
Proof. We use that max(a, b) = a+ b−min(a, b). From applying Lemma 3 with
wI = BVI(σ → σS) and expanding EXPSBV(σ→σS),σ we get exploitability no more than
O −
∑
I∈IS2 BVI(σ) plus∑
I∈IS2
max(BVI(σ → σS),BVI(σ))
≤
∑
I∈IS2
max(BVI(σ → σS),max(wI ,BVI(σ))
=
∑
I∈IS2
(
BVI(σ → σS) + max(wI ,BVI(σ))
−min(BVI(σ → σS),max(wI ,BVI(σ)))
)
≤
∑
I∈IS2
(
BVI(σ → σS) + max(wI ,BVI(σ))
−min(BVI(σ → σS), wI)
)
=
∑
I∈IS2
(
max(wI ,BVI(σ)) + max(wI ,BVI(σ → σS))− wI
)
=
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,BVI(σ)) +
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,BVI(σ → σS))−
∑
I∈IS2
wI
From Lemma 2 we get
≤
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,BVI(σ)) + USw,σ + S
Adding O −
∑
I BVI(σ) we get the upper bound O + EXP
S
w,σ + U
S
w,σ + S .
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Lemma 5 Assume we are performing one step of re-solving on subtree S, with constraint val-
ues w approximating opponent best-response values to the previous strategy σ, with an approx-
imation error bound
∑
I |wI − BVI(σ)| ≤ E . Then we have EXPSw,σ + USw,σ ≤ E .
Proof. EXPSw,σ measures the amount that the wI exceed BVI(σ), while U
S
w,σ bounds the amount
that the wI underestimate BVI(σ → σS) for any σS , including the original σ. Thus, together
they are bounded by |wI − BVI(σ)|:
EXPSw,σ + U
S
w,σ =
∑
I∈IS2
max(BVI(σ), wI)−
∑
I∈IS2
BVI(σ)
+ min
σS
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,BVI(σ → σS))−
∑
I∈IS2
wI
≤
∑
I∈IS2
max(BVI(σ), wI)−
∑
I∈IS2
BVI(σ)
+
∑
I∈IS2
max(wI ,BVI(σ))−
∑
I∈IS2
wI
=
∑
I∈IS2
[max(wI − BVI(σ), 0) + max(BVI(σ)− wI , 0)]
=
∑
I∈IS2
|wI − BVI(σ)| ≤ E
Lemma 6 Assume we are solving a game G with T iterations of CFR-D where for both play-
ers p, subtrees S, and times t, we use subtree values vI for all information sets I at the root
of S from some suboptimal black box estimator. If the estimation error is bounded, so that
minσ∗S∈NES
∑
I∈IS2 |vσ
∗
S(I)−vI | ≤ E , then the trunk exploitability is bounded by kG/
√
T+jGE
for some game specific constant kG, jG ≥ 1 which depend on how the game is split into a trunk
and subgames.
Proof. This follows from a modified version the proof of Theorem 2 of Burch et al. (17), which
uses a fixed error  and argues by induction on information sets. Instead, we argue by induction
on entire public states.
For every public state s, let Ns be the number of subgames reachable from s, including any
subgame rooted at s. Let Succ(s) be the set of our public states which are reachable from s
without going through another of our public states on the way. Note that if s is in the trunk,
then every s′ ∈ Succ(s) is in the trunk or is the root of a subgame. Let DTR(s) be the set of
our trunk public states reachable from s, including s if s is in the trunk. We argue that for any
public state s where we act in the trunk or at the root of a subgame∑
I∈s
RT,+full(I) ≤
∑
s′∈DTR(s)
∑
I∈s′
RT,+(I) + TNsE (1)
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First note that if no subgame is reachable from s, then Ns = 0 and the statement follows from
Lemma 7 of (14). For public states from which a subgame is reachable, we argue by induction
on |DTR(s)|.
For the base case, if |DTR(s)| = 0 then s is the root of a subgame S, and by assumption there
is a Nash Equilibrium subgame strategy σ∗S that has regret no more than E . If we implicitly
play σ∗S on each iteration of CFR-D, we thus accrue
∑
I∈sR
T,+
full(I) ≤ TE .
For the inductive hypothesis, we assume that (1) holds for all s such that |DTR(s)| < k.
Consider a public state s where |DTR(s)| = k. By Lemma 5 of (14) we have
∑
I∈s
RT,+full(I) ≤
∑
I∈s
RT (I) + ∑
I′∈Succ(I)
RT,+full(I)

=
∑
I∈s
RT (I) +
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
∑
I′∈s′
RT,+full(I
′)
For each s′ ∈ Succ(s), D(s′) ⊂ D(s) and s 6∈ D(s′), so |D(s′)| < |D(s)| and we can apply
the inductive hypothesis to show
∑
I∈s
RT,+full(I) ≤
∑
I∈s
RT (I) +
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
 ∑
s′′∈D(s′)
∑
I∈s′′
RT,+(I) + TNs′E

≤
∑
s′∈D(s)
∑
I∈s′
RT,+(I) + TE
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
Ns′
=
∑
s′∈D(s)
∑
I∈s′
RT,+(I) + TENs
This completes the inductive argument. By using regret matching in the trunk, we ensure
RT (I) ≤ ∆√AT , proving the lemma for kG = ∆|IT R|
√
A and jG = Nroot.
Lemma 7 Given our strategy σ, if the opponent is acting at the root of a public subtree S
from a set of actions A, with opponent best-response values BVI·a(σ) after each action a ∈ A,
then replacing our subtree strategy with any strategy that satisfies the opponent constraints
wI = maxa∈A BVI·a(σ) does not increase our exploitability.
Proof. If the opponent is playing a best response, every counterfactual value wI before the
action must either satisfy wI = BVI(σ) = maxa∈A BVI·a(σ), or not reach state s with private
information I . If we replace our strategy in S with a strategy σ′S such that BVI·a(σ
′
S) ≤ BVI(σ)
we preserve the property that BVI(σ′) = BVI(σ).
Theorem 2 Assume we have some initial opponent constraint values w from a solution gener-
ated using at least T iterations of CFR-D, we use at least T iterations of CFR-D to solve each re-
solving game, and we use a subtree value estimator such that minσ∗S∈NES
∑
I∈IS2 |vσ
∗
S(I)−vI | ≤
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E , then after d re-solving steps the exploitability of the resulting strategy is no more than
(d+ 1)k/
√
T + (2d+ 1)jE for some constants k, j specific to both the game and how it is split
into subgames.
Proof. Continual re-solving begins by solving from the root of the entire game, which we label
as subtree S0. We use CFR-D with the value estimator in place of subgame solving in order
to generate an initial strategy σ0 for playing in S0. By Lemma 6, the exploitability of σ0 is no
more than k0/
√
T + j0E .
For each step of continual re-solving i = 1, ..., d, we are re-solving some subtree Si. From
the previous step of re-solving, we have approximate opponent best-response counterfactual val-
ues B˜VI(σi−1) for each I ∈ ISi−12 , which by the estimator bound satisfy |
∑
I∈ISi−12
BVI(σi−1)−
B˜VI(σi−1)| ≤ E . Updating these values at each public state between Si−1 and Si as described
in the paper yields approximate values B˜VI(σi−1) for each I ∈ ISi2 which by Lemma 7 can
be used as constraints wI,i in re-solving. Lemma 5 with these constraints gives us the bound
EXPSiwi,σi−1 + U
Si
wi,σi−1 ≤ E . Thus by Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 we can say that the increase in
exploitability from σi−1 to σi is no more than E + Si ≤ E +ki/
√
T + jiE ≤ ki/
√
T + 2jiE .
Let k = maxi ki and j = maxi ji. Then after d re-solving steps, the exploitability is bounded
by (d+ 1)k/
√
T + (2d+ 1)jE .
Best-response Values Versus Self-play Values
DeepStack uses self-play values within the continual re-solving computation, rather than the
best-response values described in Theorem 2. Preliminary tests using CFR-D to solve smaller
games suggested that strategies generated using self-play values were generally less exploitable
and had better one-on-one performance against test agents, compared to strategies generated us-
ing best-response values. Figure 6 shows an example of DeepStack’s exploitability in a particu-
lar river subgame with different numbers of re-solving iterations. Despite lacking a theoretical
justification for its soundness, using self-play values appears to converge to low exploitability
strategies just as with using best-response values.
One possible explanation for why self-play values work well with continual re-solving is
that at every re-solving step, we give away a little more value to our best-response opponent
because we are not solving the subtrees exactly. If we use the self-play values for the opponent,
the opponent’s strategy is slightly worse than a best response, making the opponent values
smaller and counteracting the inflationary effect of an inexact solution. While this optimism
could hurt us by setting unachievable goals for the next re-solving step (an increased USw,σ
term), in poker-like games we find that the more positive expectation is generally correct (a
decreased EXPSw,σ term.)
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Figure 6: DeepStack’s exploitability within a particular public state at the start of the river as a
function of the number of re-solving iterations.
Pseudocode
Complete pseudocode for DeepStack’s depth-limited continual re-resolving algorithm is in Al-
gorithm 1. Conceptually, DeepStack can be decomposed into four functions: RE-SOLVE, VAL-
UES, UPDATESUBTREESTRATEGIES, and RANGEGADGET. The main function is RE-SOLVE,
which is called every time DeepStack needs to take an action. It iteratively calls each of the
other functions to refine the lookahead tree solution. After T iterations, an action is sampled
from the approximate equilibrium strategy at the root of the subtree to be played. According to
this action, DeepStack’s range, ~r1, and its opponent’s counterfactual values, ~v2, are updated in
preparation for its next decision point.
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Algorithm 1 Depth-limited continual re-solving
INPUT: Public state S, player range r1 over our information sets in S, opponent counterfactual values
v2 over their information sets in S, and player information set I ∈ S
OUTPUT: Chosen action a, and updated representation after the action (S(a), r1(a),v2(a))
1: function RE-SOLVE(S, r1,v2, I)
2: σ0 ← arbitrary initial strategy profile
3: r02 ← arbitrary initial opponent range
4: R0G, R
0 ← 0 . Initial regrets for gadget game and subtree
5: for t = 1 to T do
6: vt1,v
t
2 ← VALUES(S, σt−1, r1, rt−12 , 0)
7: σt, Rt ← UPDATESUBTREESTRATEGIES(S,vt1,vt2, Rt−1)
8: rt2, R
t
G ← RANGEGADGET(v2,vt2(S), Rt−1G )
9: end for
10: σT ← 1T
∑T
t=1 σ
t . Average the strategies
11: a ∼ σT (·|I) . Sample an action
12: r1(a)← 〈r1, σ(a|·)〉 . Update the range based on the chosen action
13: r1(a)← r1(a)/||r1(a)||1 . Normalize the range
14: v2(a)← 1T
∑T
t=1 v
t
2(a) . Average of counterfactual values after action a
15: return a, S(a), r1(a),v2(a)
16: end function
17: function VALUES(S, σ, r1, r2, d) . Gives the counterfactual values of the subtree S under σ,
computed with a depth-limited lookahead.
18: if S is terminal then
19: v1(S)← USr2 . Where US is the matrix of the bilinear utility function at S,
20: v2(S)← rᵀ1US U(S) = rᵀ1USr2, thus giving vectors of counterfactual values
21: return v1(S),v2(S)
22: else if d = MAX-DEPTH then
23: return NEURALNETEVALUATE(S, r1, r2)
24: end if
25: v1(S),v2(S)← 0
26: for action a ∈ S do
27: rPlayer(S)(a)← 〈rPlayer(S), σ(a|·)〉 . Update range of acting player based on strategy
28: rOpponent(S)(a)← rOpponent(S)
29: v1(S(a)),v2(S(a))← VALUE(S(a), σ, r1(a), r2(a), d+ 1)
30: vPlayer(S)(S)← vPlayer(S)(S) + σ(a|·)vPlayer(S)(S(a)) . Weighted average
31: vOpponent(S)(S)← vPlayer(S)(S) + vOpponent(S)(S(a))
. Unweighted sum, as our strategy is already in-
cluded in opponent counterfactual values
32: end for
33: return v1,v2
34: end function
36
35: function UPDATESUBTREESTRATEGIES(S,v1,v2, Rt−1)
36: for S′ ∈ {S} ∪ SubtreeDescendants(S) with Depth(S′) < MAX-DEPTH do
37: for action a ∈ S′ do
38: Rt(a|·)← Rt−1(a|·) + vPlayer(S′)(S′(a))− vPlayer(S′)(S′)
. Update acting player’s regrets
39: end for
40: for information set I ∈ S′ do
41: σt(·|I)← Rt(·|I)+∑
aR
t(a|I)+ . Update strategy with regret matching
42: end for
43: end for
44: return σt, Rt
45: end function
46: function RANGEGADGET(v2,vt2, R
t−1
G ) . Let opponent choose to play in the subtree or
receive the input value with each hand (see
Burch et al. (17))
47: σG(F|·)← R
t−1
G (F|·)+
Rt−1G (F|·)++Rt−1G (T|·)+
. F is Follow action, T is Terminate
48: rt2 ← σG(F|·)
49: vtG ← σG(F|·)vt−12 + (1− σG(F|·))v2 . Expected value of gadget strategy
50: RtG(T|·)← Rt−1G (T|·) + v2 − vt−1G . Update regrets
51: RtG(F|·)← Rt−1G (F|·) + vt2 − vtG
52: return rt2, RtG
53: end function
37
